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Abstract 
This article describes and analyses the digital terrestrial television roll-out polices 
developed and applied in Spain by conservative and socialist governments (Partido 
Popular [1996–2004] and Partido Socialista Obrero Español [2004–2010], respectively) 
from the end of the 1990s until the analogue switch-off in April 2010. It also considers, 
from national, regional and local perspectives, the implications of this digitalization 
process for the terrestrial television scene in Spain. Finally, it points to a number of 
pending public policy issues and potential market trends. As a result of this process, 
Spain has become one of the first large Western European countries with a predominantly 
terrestrial television model to switch off analogue broadcasts. 
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Spain was one of the first large Western European countries with a predominantly 
terrestrial television model to switch off analogue broadcasts. The official switch-off date 
was chosen to coincide with the renewal of analogue terrestrial television licences (3 
April 2010). Consequently, at the end of 2007, a decision was taken to implement the 
switch-off process in three phases (June 2009, December 2009 and April 2010), which 
was in fact achieved with relatively few problems. Even so, on 24 May 2010, the 
Communication Users Association (AUC 2010) issued a public statement denouncing a 
number of issues, such as the lack of new features and innovation in digital terrestrial 
television (DTT) content, the absence of planning in terms of users being able to get hold 
of the right equipment in order to enjoy high-definition (HD) or three-dimensional 
broadcasts, and the poor use of satellite to cover ‘shadow’ areas. 
According to the Government of Spain, having an earlier analogue switch-off date 
than other European Union countries meant that Spanish companies would be able to 
install DTT infrastructures in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, 
etc. In fact, the government claimed that Spanish companies in the DTT business sector 
had positioned themselves strategically in order to service future markets, such as Latin 
America, Asia and Africa (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio 2010a). 
This article summarizes the main DTT roll-out policies developed and applied in 
Spain between 1998 and May 2010. At the same time, it analyses the changes that, as a 
consequence of this process, the Spanish television scene has experienced.  
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Given the complexity of this scene, policies and changes impacting on national, 
regional and local broadcasts shall be dealt with separately. From this point onwards, 
when reference is made to the regional context, it should be understood as being 
synonymous with coverage in the territory of one of the seventeen autonomous 
communities into which, since the restoration of democracy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the territory of Spain has been divided. 
At the end of the document, and by way of a conclusion, the article considers 
pending policy issues, such as the introduction of HDTV and mobile DTT. It will also 
point to potential trends in the evolution of the DTT market.  
 
1. Some contextual considerations 
In Spain, television broadcasts have traditionally been terrestrial. Analogue cable 
broadcasts had always been very marginal (except in the Region of Murcia) until cabling 
was carried out for third-generation networks and triple-play services were offered – 
mainly in urban centres – in the 2000s. In 2010, the cable business – and digital cable 
television in particular – is controlled by a company called Ono, which enjoys a de facto 
monopoly, even though the sector was deregulated in 2005. When analogue terrestrial 
television was switched off, there were around 1.3 million cable subscribers in Spain, out 
of a total of more than 17 million television households.  
Meanwhile, the digital satellite television sector, which was liberalized in 1995, is 
experiencing a major crisis because the only existing platform, Digital+ (created 
following a merger in 2003 between Canal Satélite Digital and Via Digital), has lost its 
football broadcast rights. Moreover, Digital+ is the main cause of the highly complex 
financial situation in which its promoter and current owner, the PRISA group, now finds 
itself. Indeed, that group has been trying to divest itself gradually of Digital+ for some 
time (Almiron 2007). That said, at the end of 2009, Digital+ had more than 1.8 million 
subscribers.  
In any event, despite the evolution that new platforms (satellite, cable and IPTV) 
have experienced over the last decade, at the beginning of 2010, terrestrial television had 
the strongest presence by far in Spanish homes.  
However, this presence was even stronger in 1998, when the initial measures 
aimed at rolling out DTT were adopted. At the end of the 1990s, five analogue terrestrial 
television channels with national coverage were being broadcast: two public channels 
(TVE1 and TVE2, launched under Franco’s dictatorship), two private free-to-air channels 
(Antena 3 and Telecinco) and one private pay-TV channel (Canal+). The three private 
channels’ broadcasts began in 1990. At that time (the turn of the century), the private 
channels had major shareholders like Telefónica (Antena 3), Mediaset (Telecinco) and 
PRISA (Canal+). In addition, there were six regional public television operators. Three of 
them – those in Catalonia, the Basque Country and the Valencian Community – had two 
channels each. These regional public television operators competed for audience share 
with the national public television operator’s first channel (TVE1) and the two national 
private television operators’ free-to-air channels (Antena 3 and Telecinco).  
The situation for local television was very different. A bill had been passed in 
1995, setting out that each municipality could have one local public television station 
and, if frequencies were available, one local commercial television station. However, the 
Government of Spain never approved the required technical plan for frequencies for local 
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analogue terrestrial television, and, consequently, the regions were never able to grant 
broadcasting licences. Town or city councils and private companies that chose to provide 
a local television service (741 in 1999 according to the Asociación para la Investigación 
de Medios de Comunicación) did so in a situation of major legal uncertainty until the 
advent of DTT.  
In this context, and shortly before signing the Chester 1997 Agreements for the 
coordination of spectrum policies on an international scale, the Government of Spain, 
whose governing party at that time was the conservative Partido Popular, decided to turn 
Spain into one of Europe’s pioneering countries in terms of DTT roll-out. In fact, 
alongside the United Kingdom and Sweden, Spain will be one of the first European 
States to plan the DTT spectrum.  
Powers for communication policy in Spain are shared between the State and the 
autonomous communities. Among other things, this means that the State has exclusive 
powers over radio-electric spectrum planning for terrestrial radio and television 
broadcasts, whereas the granting of licences depends on the operators’ coverage 
(national, regional or local). Consequently, central government grants licences for 
national coverage and the regional governments – the Catalan Audiovisual Council 
(CAC) in Catalonia – grant licences for regional and local coverage, with considerable 
room for manoeuvre when it comes to setting the criteria for granting them.  
 
2. National DTT 
In the process of rolling out DTT with national coverage in Spain, there are two clearly 
identifiable phases: the first, basically promoted from 1998 by the Partido Popular 
conservative government, which opted for pay-TV as the driver of digitalization, which 
ended in failure; and the second, beginning when the socialist government gained power 
in March 2004, which initially opted for free-to-air DTT, which led to a successful 
switch-off in April 2010. However, as we shall see later, the latter was not devoid of 
contradictions. 
The following sections deal with the most significant traits of the policies 
developed and applied in these two phases. They particularly underscore the implications 
of policies that overturned restrictions on mergers between companies with DTT 
capacity. Such measures may considerably affect television pluralism, as indicated by the 
proposed acquisition of PRISA’s DTT business by Gestevisión Telecinco (Mediaset).  
 
2.1. Failure of the conservative Partido Popular’s policies: Quiero TV bankruptcy 
With the approval of the National Technical Plan for DTT in 1998, five multiplexes 
(twenty programmes) were set aside for broadcasts with State-wide coverage. Of these 
five multiplexes, one was for operators providing an analogue service: two public 
channels (TVE1 and TVE2) and three private channels (Antena 3, Telecinco and 
Canal+), which would find it very hard to coexist in one multiplex with a capacity for 
four programmes plus added-value services. Therefore, crammed into this multiplex were 
the most experienced companies in the sector (including the public operator), while 
fourteen programmes (three and a half multiplexes) were set aside for a multichannel 
pay-TV platform (Quiero TV) and the two remaining programmes were set aside for the 
granting of free-to-air DTT licences (Veo TV and Net TV). The multichannel pay-TV 
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platform and the two new free-to-air DTT licence-holders could only broadcast using 
digital technology (Bustamante 2008; García Leiva 2008). 
 
Thus, the first distribution of DTT multiplexes with national coverage in Spain 
was as follows: 
 
Multiplex Programmes 
Channel 69 Quiero TV Quiero TV Quiero TV Quiero TV 
68 Quiero TV Quiero TV Quiero TV Quiero TV 
67 Quiero TV Quiero TV Quiero TV Quiero TV 
66 Quiero TV Quiero TV Veo Televisión Net Televisión 
 
57–66* TVE1 TVE2 Antena 3 Canal + Telecinco 
*Note: The multiplex set aside for historic operators is the only one that allows for 
regional opt-outs; hence, it requires several radio frequency channels. 
 
 Quiero TV’s major shareholder was Retevisión (49 per cent). Veo TV was owned 
by Unidad Editorial, the Spanish subsidiary of RCS Mediagroup, and by the Recoletos 
group (bought out by Unidad Editorial in 2007). Net TV belonged to Prensa Española 
(now Vocento) and to the Árbol group, which is now part of Imagina Media Audiovisual.  
 
Consequently, between 1999 and 2000, an essentially pay-TV DTT model was 
created, and broadcasts began in May 2000. This was a highly controversial decision 
since, at that time, there were two multichannel satellite pay-TV platforms (Canal Satélite 
Digital and Vía Digital) with the same business model as the terrestrial platform. They 
had been considering merging the two for quite some, since it was clear that there was no 
room in the market for both. In addition, Retevisión, the reference shareholder of Quiero 
TV, had significant shareholdings in the cable business, which was another competitor 
for the multichannel terrestrial pay-TV platform (Fernández Alonso 2004). 
All of this was set within a context in which the stakeholders involved in the 
process of DTT roll-out (the Government of Spain, television companies, receiver 
manufacturers, aerial fitters, etc.) were not properly coordinated to simultaneously take 
the new technology forward. For example, DTT promotion campaigns were not carried 
out well enough, and the citizens – who were not used to having to pay to watch 
television – bought very few set-top boxes. As a result, the manufacturers were left with a 
considerable stock of these products sitting in their warehouses. Meanwhile, television 
companies did not produce specific content for DTT because the business seemed 
unviable. Consequently, they did not contribute to raising customer demand. Confronted 
with this situation, in the spring of 2002, Quiero TV (which only had 90,000 subscribers) 
went bust and handed back its licences, and, in 2004, the Partido Popular conservative 
government decided to make the licence contract conditions more flexible for Veo TV 
and Net TV (for example, their shareholding stability obligations were removed and the 
commitment to prioritizing national and European Union audio-visual production was 
postponed). Although the remit of these two was limited to rebroadcasting content 
produced for other platforms, they lost quite a lot of money because they had to pay for 
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the costs associated with the broadcasting of the signal (Bustamante 2008; García Leiva 
2008). 
The Socialist government elected in March 2004 was therefore forced to 
reconsider how to allocate the spectrum freed up after Quiero TV surrendered its licence. 
Because Quiero TV was the main DTT operator, this required a plan to re-launch the 
whole DTT platform. 
 
2.2. Contradictions in the socialist government’s DTT policies  
In December 2004, the socialist government approved a plan to promote DTT, which led 
to a number of different actions. Of these actions, some of the most noteworthy were the 
coordination of all stakeholders involved through the Monitoring Commission for the 
Transition towards Digital Terrestrial Television, administered by the Spanish Ministry 
of Industry, Tourism and Trade from February 2005; the creation, at the end of 2005, of 
Impulsa TDT, an association bringing together public and private television operators – 
both national and regional – and the network operator Abertis in order to promote DTT in 
collaboration with various public authorities; the redistribution, throughout 2005, of the 
spectrum freed up after Quiero TV went bust; and, of course, the three-phase switch-off 
plan mentioned earlier, which was approved in December 2007 (Fernández Alonso 
2008). 
 The redistribution of the spectrum was firmed up with the reform of the 1998 
National Technical Plan for DTT. Thus, Royal Decree 944/2005 outlined a scenario for 
the transition period (2005–2010) and another scenario for the post switch-off period. For 
the transition period, it first set aside five programmes for the State public television 
operator TVE. Second, it set aside one for each of the five private operators holding 
terrestrial television licences that were actually broadcasting (simulcasting or digital 
broadcasting only). Third, it announced a new tender to grant two new DTT programmes 
to one company. This amounted to a total of twelve programmes. Therefore, there were 
another eight still available from the original twenty programmes planned in 1998. 
 After tough negotiations with the companies (and on the basis of the provisions 
that Royal Decree 944/2005 set out for distribution), these eight programmes were 
distributed by the Spanish Council of Ministers on 25 November 2005. The Council 
agreed to grant two additional programmes to each of the three private analogue 
terrestrial television companies (Gestevisión Telecinco, S.A.; Antena 3 de Televisión, 
S.A. and Sogecable, S.A.), and one additional programme to two DTT-only companies 
(Sociedad Gestora de Televisión NET TV, S.A. and Veo Televisión, S.A.). The same 
Council of Ministers agreed to grant two new DTT programmes (free-to-air, like all the 
previous programmes) to Gestora de Inversiones Audiovisuales La Sexta, S.A., with a 
special feature in the new licence enabling the licence-holder to broadcast one of its 
channels using analogue technology. 
 In order to take this decision, it was first necessary to reform the 1988 Private 
Television Act, which only allowed for the existence of three private analogue terrestrial 
television channels with national coverage. Therefore, the socialist government, arguing 
that it would foster pluralism, authorized a fourth private analogue terrestrial television 
channel (free-to-air) at the height of the digital transition process. The beneficiary of this 
concession was an emerging communication group (Imagina Media Audiovisual), which 
was essentially taking shape around two large production companies, the Catalan-based 
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Mediapro and the Madrid-based Globomedia. Ideologically speaking, the group was 
more left wing than the PRISA group and closer than PRISA to the socialist government 
(Bustamante 2008; Fernández Alonso 2008).  
 In order to understand the new DTT map following the 2005 reforms, account 
needs to be taken of another political decision: the modification of the contract signed in 
1989 between central government and Sogecable to allow PRISA to switch from offering 
terrestrial pay-TV services (Canal+) to offering free-to-air services on the same 
frequency (Cuatro). This decision – explained by a change in PRISA’s commercial 
strategy – was taken by the Council of Ministers on 29 July 2005, arguing, once again, 
that it would foster pluralism. Thus, the only terrestrial pay-TV offering that existed in 
Spain after Quiero TV went bust disappeared from the television scene, and a completely 
free-to-air model was formed, with five channels offered by the public operator and 
fifteen channels offered by six private companies. Of these six, three (the historical ones, 
which had licences to provide analogue services) had three channels each, while the other 
three (the terrestrial television licence-holders in the DTT roll-out context) had two each. 
As we shall see later, this situation would even itself out after the analogue switch-off, 
when each licence-holder had a multiplex carrying four programmes.  
 To the contradictory decision taken in 2005 of authorizing a new analogue 
channel when Veo TV’s and Net TV’s applications for analogue channels had been 
rejected (both channels being very critical of the socialist government), a further two 
measures taken in 2009 should be added, the main protagonist of which was also the 
Imagina group. First, when it seemed that Spain had opted for a free-to-air DTT model, in 
2009 the socialist government once again chose to give the green light to a pay-TV DTT 
model (in principle, with a maximum of one programme per licence-holder). This 
decision was embodied in a decree-law, a measure that the Spanish Constitution only 
foresees for situations of extraordinary and urgent need. A few weeks later, the Imagina 
group, which had gradually bought most of the broadcast rights for La Liga (First 
Division of the Spanish Professional Football League), launched Gol TV, a pay-TV DTT 
channel. 
Second, a few months earlier, in February 2009, using the same decree-law 
method, the Government of Spain had made the regulations for media concentration more 
flexible. This allowed companies holding licences for DTT with national coverage to 
merge their businesses on condition that the total audience figure for all of their channels 
did not exceed 27 per cent of the share, that they did not have more than two national 
multiplexes, and that there were at least three licence-holders. This was exactly the same 
number of licence-holders that, in 2005, was considered insufficient to guarantee 
pluralism, and the reason why the Private Television Act was modified to allow La Sexta 
to offer analogue broadcasts.  
As a consequence of the policies described, this was the map of DTT with 
national coverage in Spain after the analogue switch-off (April 2010): 
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Licence-holding company 
(major shareholders) 
Programmes 
 
DTT audience 
share, March 2010 
according to Kantar 
Media 
 
Televisión Española, S.A. 
(TVE – public operator) 
La 1  
La 2 
Canal 24horas 
Clan 
Teledeporte 
16.8% 
3.6% 
0.9% 
3.8% 
0.9% 
Antena 3 de Televisión S.A. 
(Planeta de Agostini (44.58%)) 
Antena 3 
Antena Neox 
Antena Nova 
12.4% 
2.4% 
1.4% 
Gestevisión Telecinco S.A. 
(Mediaset Investimenti, S.P.A. 
(50.14%)) 
Telecinco 
FDF 
La Siete 
14.2% 
1.5% 
1.4% 
Sogecable S.A.U. 
(PRISA (100%)) 
Cuatro 
CNN+ 
40 Latino 
6.8% 
0.7% 
0.4% 
Veo Televisión, S.A. 
(Unidad Editorial (100) – subsidiary 
of RCS Mediagroup) 
VEO 7 
SET en VEO 
1.0% 
0.6% 
Sociedad Gestora de Televisión Net 
TV, S.A. 
(Vocento (55%), Intereconomía 
(25%), Disney (20%)) 
Intereconomía 
Disney Channel 
1.2% 
2.8% 
Gestora de Inversiones Audiovisuales  
La Sexta, S.A. 
(Imagina Media Audiovisual 
(51.66%), Televisa (40.52%)) 
La Sexta  
Gol TV* 
7.6% 
 
*Gol TV was the only pay-TV channel at the time of switch-off. 
 
Royal Decree 944/2005, as referred to earlier, set out that, after the switch-off, 
DTT offerings with national coverage would increase: Televisión Española would have 
two multiplexes (eight programmes) and each private licence-holder would have one full 
multiplex (four programmes). 
 
2.3. Negotiations between the main television companies 
When analogue terrestrial television was switched off (April 2010), a number of business 
operations were being negotiated between the owners of private television companies 
with national coverage that, if concluded, would significantly transform the map of the 
television sector.  
As mentioned earlier, in March 2006, there were six operators in Spain holding 
licences for DTT with national coverage, broadcasting fifteen different programmes. In 
2009, coinciding with Act 7/2009 of 3 July, which enacted the Government of Spain’s 
decree-law on concentration referred to earlier, news began to emerge of negotiations 
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between the DTT licence-holding companies to join forces. This would allow them to 
offer advertisers significant audience ratings and, at the same time, relieve the pressure 
being placed on them by their creditor banks. PRISA, for example, paid the consequences 
of a calamitous bid to takeover Sogecable (Almiron 2007), and Imagina lacked sufficient 
own funds to cover the losses made by some of its business units (Perspectivas del 
Mundo de la Comunicación 2010). PRISA and Imagina Media Audiovisual are the most 
politically progressive of Spanish national groups.  
 
2.3.1. Gestevisión Telecinco and PRISA  
In December 2009, the boards of directors of the companies Gestevisión Telecinco, S.A. 
(in which Mediaset Investimenti S.P.A. has a 50.14% shareholding) and Promotora de 
Informaciones, S.A. (PRISA) announced that Gestevisión would buy the business for 
DTT with national coverage from the PRISA group and 22% of its digital satellite 
television platform Digital+ (Gestevisión Telecinco S.A. and Promotora de 
Informaciones SA., 2009). The agreement implies the creation of a new company that 
would be 100% owned by Gestevisión, which would manage two of the eight multiplexes 
planned for DTT in 2011. 
On 14 April 2010, the master contract was signed, which set out the procedure, 
timelines and other terms and conditions for implementing the agreement of December 
2009 (Gestevisión Telecinco SA and Promotora de Informaciones SA, 2010a). This 
document specifies the consideration that PRISA will receive for the sale of its DTT 
business and 22% of its digital satellite television platform. Firstly, it will receive 
€491.128 million in cash and, second, newly issued shares in Gestevisión equivalent to 
18.37% of its share capital, giving PRISA the right to have two out of fifteen board 
members on Gestevisión’s board of directors (Expansion.com 2010b). In addition, in its 
first year as a shareholder, PRISA will be able to appoint a vice-chairman and a director 
of news services (Expansion.com 2009). PRISA is bound not to sell its shareholding in 
Gestevisión for one year. However, it would have the option to sell its shareholding to 
Mediaset at the end of that period (Expansion.com 2009). Faced with this constraint, 
PRISA’s CEO, Juan Luis Cebrián, said that Gestevisión Telecinco would be very 
profitable and that they had no intention of leaving (Expansion.com 2010a). 
In December 2009, it was announced that Gestevisión would have to increase its 
capital in order to be able to fund the operation. The capital increase was approved by the 
company’s shareholders at the general meeting held on 14 April 2010. This explains why 
the contract referred to earlier, between the parties involved in the operation, could not be 
signed until that date. The total amount of the capital increase is €61,660,464, which can 
be implemented in one or several stages within a maximum five-year period (Gestevisión 
2010b). Gestevisión’s current shareholders have preferential subscription rights in the 
capital increase, and Mediaset Investimenti S.P.A., an Italian group linked to the 
Berlusconi family, has committed to subscribing to the whole of its share in this increase 
in order to keep its current shareholding percentage, which is 50.14%.  
Even though the authors consider it too soon to be able to draw any conclusions 
from this operation, it is worth pointing out that the new television company plans to 
control 45.1% of advertising revenue in the Spanish television market, in a context where 
the public television operator (TVE) stopped broadcasting advertising in January 2010 
(Expansion.com 2009). (Inspired by the French policy, this measure means that since 
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January 2010, the Spanish national public broadcaster has been funded essentially from 
State subsidies and part of the operating revenues of private television companies and 
telecommunications operators, even though EU competition authorities have yet to 
decide whether or not this model is valid). 
In 2009 The Financial Times reported that Mediaset was the big winner in this 
agreement. It consolidated its position in Spain at a cash cost of €500 million. It was not 
clear, however, what the results for PRISA would be. Even though its strategic position 
had improved, the company still needed to re-finance debt of €5 billion. While PRISA 
believed this to be possible, it would more than likely need to sell more assets or increase 
capital to do so (Lex Column FT 2009). 
After the analogue switch-off in Spain, this operation was pending approval by 
the Spanish regulatory and competition authorities (Gestevisión Telecinco SA and 
Promotora de Informaciones SA 2010a) 
While these negotiations were taking place, PRISA seemed to be taking decisions 
to take advantage of the opportunity of pay-TV DTT with national coverage. According 
to the terms of the agreement between both companies, PRISA would manage the pay-
TV offering of the merged group. The group has a lot of experience in the multichannel 
pay-TV business segment and, therefore, it may try and take advantage of the edge it has 
to finally make a profit.  
Shortly after the analogue switch-off, there was some news suggesting that PRISA 
might launch a pay-TV DTT channel in September 2010, which might be marketed under 
the Canal+ brand. Paradoxically, throughout 2009, PRISA was the main opponent to pay-
TV DTT, since it was damaging to Digital+ (Montalvo and Morán 2010). 
 
2.3.2. Antena 3 de Televisión and Gestora de Inversiones Audiovisuales La Sexta 
The Spanish media have repeatedly published news about another buy-out operation. In 
this instance, Antena 3 de Televisión, S.A. (in which the Planeta de Agostini group has a 
44.58% shareholding and the Bertelsmann group has a 20.49% shareholding) would buy 
Gestora de Inversiones Audiovisuales La Sexta, S.A. (in which the Imagina group has a 
51.66% shareholding and the Televisa group has a 40.52% shareholding). 
As at the date of the analogue switch-off in Spain, there was no official 
information about this operation. Of the two companies involved, only Antena 3 de 
Televisión, S.A. is quoted on the stock exchange. Therefore, it is the only one that has a 
legal obligation to publicly announce negotiations of this type. In December 2009, 
Antena 3 de Televisión notified the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores(Spanish 
National Commission of the Stock Market) that it had been holding talks with various 
operators to explore potential ways of integrating its audio-visual businesses, including 
La Sexta, although no verbal or written agreement had been reached with any of them at 
that time (Antena 3 de Televisión 2009). Since then, Antena 3 has not announced any 
changes in this respect. 
At the end of April 2010, the economy and finance newspaper Expansión (RCS 
Mediagroup) contained a comment made by the financial director of Antena 3 TV, which 
suggested that the operation would not take place in the short term because it was very 
complex and the parties had differing interests (Expansion.com 2010c). The CEO of La 
Sexta had also stated that talks between both companies were difficult (Expansion.com 
2010d). 
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If the business operations described above are concluded (Gestevisión Telecinco 
and Sogecable on the one hand, and Antena 3 de Televisión and La Sexta on the other), 
they will both benefit from two full DTT multiplexes when digital dividend reassignment 
is firmed up. 
 
3. Regional DTT 
At the height of Spain’s transition towards democracy, the 1978 Spanish Constitution laid 
the foundations for the creation in Spain of a highly decentralized political system 
divided into autonomous communities (newly created) and municipalities (already in 
existence). The autonomous communities (the ‘regions’) progressively formed their 
respective governments and parliaments, and have gradually taken on wide-ranging 
powers, including powers for the media. The 1978 Spanish Constitution sets out that the 
State has exclusive authority for basic norms on media issues, ‘without prejudice to the 
faculties which in their development and execution belong to the Autonomous 
Communities’ (article 149.1.27). In practice, and in the specific instance of television, 
this means, for example, that there has been ever-greater leeway to promote public 
operators (and to regulate their organization and operation) and to grant broadcasting 
licences to private operators. 
In Spain, regional television was authorized in 1983 by Third Television Channel 
Act 46/1983, and regional television stations were exclusively publicly owned until 1998. 
This Act allowed regions to have their own public television stations, and those who 
decided to do so gradually set them up. The first ones emerged in territories where 
nationalist feelings were more deep rooted: the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. In 
these cases, television was conceived as a tool for ‘national reconstruction’ and language 
standardization, which, given that it was at the service of these initiatives, was as 
politicized as State-wide public television, which was at the service of the government in 
office. The way in which TVE was politicized was copied by television stations in the 
regions. 
When analogue terrestrial television was switched off, there were thirteen regional 
public television stations, meaning that all regions had a public operator apart from 
Cantabria, Castilla y León, La Rioja and Navarre. The main reason why these regions did 
not have public television stations was the high level of funding they require. In fact, 
regional public television stations generally have high deficits, despite the fact that they 
are able to broadcast advertising and receive public subsidies.  
Through the 1998 National Technical Plan for DTT, referred to earlier when 
talking about DTT with national coverage, central government, whose governing party at 
that time was the conservative Partido Popular, also outlined the design for regional DTT. 
The most significant novel aspect of the model was that it authorized the creation of 
regional private television stations. 
The plan allocated one multiplex carrying four programmes to each region as 
from 31 October 1999. Of these four programmes, two were set aside for public 
television stations using analogue technology for their broadcasts so that they could either 
start simulcasting or create an additional channel if they only had one analogue channel. 
The other two programmes could be awarded to private companies by public tender.  
In the first phase of DTT roll-out (1998–2005), only four regions granted 
broadcasting licences to the private sector: Madrid, La Rioja, Navarre and Catalonia.  
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Madrid led the way in this process. The analogue public channel Telemadrid 
began simulcasting on digital, and a second digital-only public channel La Otra was 
started. In November 1999, the government granted two licences to private companies: 
one to Prensa Española, S.A. (now part of the Vocento group) and one to Onda Digital, 
S.A., the company that owned Quiero TV. The Prensa Española television station began 
operating and is still broadcasting under the Onda 6 brand, but Onda Digital’s regional 
television station never commenced.   
La Rioja and Navarre did not have regional public television stations and their 
respective governments had repeatedly stated that they had no intention of setting any up. 
However, they took advantage of DTT to allow private television stations to operate in 
their respective territories. La Rioja granted two licences for DTT with regional coverage 
to the Vocento group and another two to the COPE group (owned by the Catholic 
Church), but when analogue terrestrial television was switched off, both licence-holders 
were only broadcasting one channel each. There was a similar situation in Navarre, where 
the winners of the two licences (four programmes in total) were the PRISA group and the 
Promecal group (a regional group from another region of Spain). 
Catalonia was also involved in the launch of regional DTT from the outset. A 
special feature of this early involvement was that it awarded a full multiplex (planned by 
central government) to the public operator and awarded a second full multiplex (not 
planned, though its situation was regularized in 2005) to a Catalan private group, Grupo 
Godó, which had not managed to complete the four-channel offering by May 2010. 
Meanwhile, the Basque Country also opted for a policy that, from the outset, also 
deviated from the idea put forward in the 1998 National Technical Plan for DTT (two 
public channels and two private channels). In fact, the Government of the Basque 
Country chose to set aside the whole multiplex for the public sector and to limit private 
television offerings to the local setting.  
In this very diverse context, the reform of the 1998 National Technical Plan for 
DTT referred to earlier, which was carried out by the socialist government in 2005 
(Royal Decree 944/2005), set out that there would be a second multiplex for each region 
after the switch-off, or before if technically feasible. In addition, regional governments 
would have the authority to decide whether regional television stations were going to be 
managed by public or private companies. An exception to this rule was that public 
television stations already broadcasting had to have the same number of programmes set 
aside for them as before, so that they could simulcast. This analogue and digital simulcast 
situation continued until the analogue switch-off. 
In short, for regional DTT, there were very few novel aspects in terms of design in 
this second DTT roll-out phase (2005–2010): the regions were given greater broadcasting 
capacity, and the option of television stations being public or private was made more 
flexible. 
The results (based on data for television stations actually broadcasting, and not on 
licence-holders as a whole) up to April 2010 are as follows: regional DTT is being 
broadcast via 62 programmes (34 are publicly managed and 28 are privately managed, 
and they are all free-to-air); of the privately managed programmes, seventeen are 
connected with big communication groups in the Spanish market, such as Vocento (six), 
COPE (five), Godó (four), PRISA (one) and Unidad Editorial (one); and there is only one 
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region that does not have DTT for its territory, which is Cantabria (Mundoplus.tv 2010; 
ImpulsaTDT 2010). 
To end this section, it is worth pointing out that the Vocento group is the private 
group that has made the clearest moves to position itself in regional DTT. Shortly after 
the analogue switch-off, it brought together its six stations under one brand, called La 10. 
Before that, in 2009, it had signed an agreement to offer free-to-air broadcasts of Viacom 
content (Nickelodeon, MTV and Paramount Comedy) on its regional television stations. 
Therefore, it buys the content, whose production is the most costly part of the television 
business, and is in charge of marketing it, while designing advantageous packages for its 
advertisers. 
The PRISA group’s case is very different. Due to its difficult financial situation, it 
decided to surrender the licences it had been granted for regional DTT, except for its 
television station in Navarre, which it is trying to sell.  
 
4. Local DTT 
As pointed out in Section 1, since its emergence in the 1980s, local terrestrial television 
in Spain had existed in a situation of major legal uncertainty (broadcasting without any 
licences) until the process for the introduction of DTT got under way. It was in 2004, 
after the approval of the Technical Plan for Local DTT Frequencies, when the regions 
began to start the process of tendering to grant the first broadcasting licences (Corominas 
et al. 2007). 
 The digitalization model for local terrestrial television was designed by the 
second Partido Popular conservative government (2000–2004) and adopted – with 
minimal reforms – by the socialist government, after the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español had regained power. This model involved a clear modification of the local 
television concept, which, until that time, had been synonymous with television having 
municipal coverage (whose public television stations were managed by the councils of 
the respective municipalities).  
Following the approval of the National Technical Plan for Local DTT (March 
2004), the scope of local terrestrial television coverage became the ‘demarcation’, which, 
with the exception of eight cases (consisting of just one municipality), brought together 
several municipalities (in some cases up to 30 or so), on the basis of technical rather than 
sociocultural criteria. In general, each demarcation (265 across the country) was allocated 
one local DTT multiplex, usually with a capacity for four programmes plus added-value 
services. Initially, under the Partido Popular conservative government, one of the four 
programmes was for local public television, and the other three were for local private 
television. A special feature applicable to the public programme was that it had to be 
jointly managed by the councils of the various municipalities in each demarcation that 
were interested in getting involved in local DTT. Therefore, a new television model 
emerged: local public television managed jointly by several town or city councils. In 
addition, public television was no longer a political priority, as a greater part of the 
spectrum was set aside for private television. Even though the 1995 Local Television Act 
was never developed, it set out, as already mentioned, that if a frequency was only 
available for one local analogue terrestrial television operator in a municipality, then that 
operator would be public.  
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Subsequently, between 2004 and 2005, the socialist government made some 
minor changes to the technical plan, which, in general, responded to the demands of 
autonomous communities with a stronger local television tradition, such as Catalonia and 
Andalusia. Consequently, they were awarded an additional multiplex for three and two of 
their demarcations, respectively. The socialist reform also allowed regions to allocate a 
second programme of each multiplex to the local public sector (which indeed had a 
greater presence in the two regions referred to earlier), and involved the planning of ten 
new multiplexes with island coverage, for the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands 
(Corominas et al. 2005; Fernández Alonso et al. 2007).  
In this context, the regions began to start the process of tendering to grant local 
DTT licences to private operators and to negotiate with town and city councils on the 
creation of consortiums for the management of local public television.  
The various processes of tendering have often been marked by a significant 
degree of politicization, with regional governments giving priority to like-minded media 
groups. The comparative studies carried out halfway through the process of granting 
licences (based on the results of completed tenders in the first seven regions to start the 
process) showed that Spanish media companies like PRISA, Cope or Vocento, which had 
begun to invest in local television at the end of the 1990s despite the legal uncertainties of 
the sector at that time, came off well in terms of DTT licence distribution. Two 
exceptions to this were the regions of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, where there is a 
stronger presence of locally based tender winners (Corominas et al. 2007; Fernández 
Alonso et al. 2007). It should be noted, however, that when analogue terrestrial television 
was switched off, PRISA had abandoned this business sector due its cost-cutting policy, 
in an attempt to obtain liquidity and pay off its huge debt. 
In any event, the sector’s future is very uncertain. The conclusions of a report that 
the CAC submitted to the parliament of the Government of Catalonia in 2009 provide 
good evidence of that fact. With the analogue switch-off just around the corner, the report 
gave a fairly pessimistic prognosis for the future of Catalan local DTT. The study (CAC 
2009) is very significant because Catalonia is the region of Spain with the most robust 
and well-organized local television structure, and the territory where local public 
television is more likely to prosper (in some regions, not a single local public television 
station has been set up). Josep Àngel Guimerà, a lecturer at the Autonomous University 
of Barcelona and the lead author of this report, has gradually updated the data obtained 
since 2009. In his opinion, the determining factors of the crisis in the Catalan local DTT 
sector – which we believe can be extrapolated to all the regions of Spain as a whole – 
can, above all, be found in a model designed by public policies. In a face-to-face 
conversation with the co-authors, Guimerà pointed out that neither the reality of pre-
existing analogue broadcasts nor criteria of a sociocultural nature had been taken into 
account in the process of transition towards local DTT. First, the fact that several town or 
city councils have to jointly manage a public channel in each demarcation has prevented 
most of the channels from being launched due to all sorts of disagreements. Second, four 
television stations in each demarcation are anticipated, when, in many instances, the 
market cannot even sustain one or two at most. Finally, broadcasting costs are, on some 
occasions, particularly high. Confronted with all of this is a sector that has very little 
financial liquidity and very little or no room for manoeuvre in terms of profit. In short, 
there are too many hurdles for such a fragile sector. This explains why, when analogue 
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terrestrial television was switched off, only half of the licence-holders in Catalonia were 
broadcasting. 
 
5. Assessment and outlook  
From all of the above, it is possible to conclude that DTT policies in Spain have 
been somewhat erratic. In the first phase of DTT roll-out, there were important planning 
and coordination failures, one of the main ones being to opt for a multichannel pay-TV 
platform as the driver of digitalization. Then, throughout the process, there were 
measures that tended to benefit like-minded media groups, something that is very 
characteristic of southern European polarized pluralist media systems (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004). In addition to the different processes for granting licences, examples of 
such measures are the modification of the licence conditions for Sogecable (PRISA) 
which, since 2005, has been able to offer free-to-air television services; and the 
authorization of pay-TV DTT in 2009 at the request of the Imagina group, which had 
invested heavily in buying the broadcast rights for major sporting events. Both of these 
measures, which were adopted by socialist governments, are beneficial to communication 
groups that are ideologically like-minded, which, as already mentioned, are going 
through difficult financial times. 
In the preamble to the Act that made the regulations for media concentration more 
flexible, the socialist government recognized that it was necessary to guarantee the 
financial stability of existing companies in order to ensure that they do not abandon their 
commitment to DTT on the one hand, and to make it easier for them to be able to attract 
the necessary financial capital for their viability on the other. This immediately gave rise 
to business integration operations in which the same groups are involved (PRISA and 
Imagina), which, for the moment at least, will strengthen Mediaset’s position in the 
Spanish media market. 
In Spain, the advertising crisis led to a decrease of 11% and 16% in commercial 
television stations’ revenue in 2008 and 2009, respectively. This seriously affected the 
profit and loss accounts of the sector’s companies. Telecinco and Antena 3 are much less 
profitable (between 2007 and 2008, Telecinco’s return on sales fell from 33% to 20%, 
while Antena 3’s fell from 21% to 12%). Cuatro and La Sexta have not managed to make 
a profit since they commenced. 
If the business integration operations are concluded, the companies will cut their 
costs and offer advertisers a wider variety of packages for their investment, as well as 
audience ratings higher than 20%, which can only be achieved by combining the viewers 
of several channels. Of course, this can only be done if they manage to overcome the 
clash of business cultures that will undoubtedly occur. For example, the editorial profiles 
of Cuatro (PRISA) and Telecinco (Gestevisión) are totally different. In addition to this, 
audio-visual content providers (production companies, rights owners, etc,) will have 
fewer yet more solvent buyers; this will lead to an improvement in their current situation, 
which is characterized by falling prices and delays in getting paid, both of which cause 
serious cashflow problems (Perspectivas del Mundo de la Comunicación 2010). 
 In the new television scene resulting from digitalization, it is necessary to 
underscore the fact that new television models will emerge in Spain in the DTT context. 
Examples of these are private terrestrial television stations with regional coverage and 
local public television stations managed jointly by several municipalities. That said, 
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regional private DTT stations and, above all, local DTT stations are confronted with an 
uncertain future. The high number of planned programmes coupled with the particular 
impact of the crisis in the volume of advertising generated by the property sector (which 
mainly advertises in local media) is one of the factors that explain this situation. In 
addition, the winners of regional and local DTT licences have basically been large 
Spanish communication groups that do not give priority to terrestrial television offerings 
of limited coverage when it comes to designing their global strategies. In all of this, it 
should not be forgotten that DTT allows the situation of local operators to be regularized. 
These operators had experienced two decades of major legal uncertainty because they did 
not have broadcasting licences.  
 Looking towards the future, it should be underscored that, in addition to highly 
unforeseeable market movements and the inevitable adjustments in channel content 
(themed channels emerging in the digital environment, apart from children’s channels, 
account for about 1% of the share), there are several important pending policy issues. 
Among these are the redistribution of the spectrum following the switch-off and the 
introduction of HDTV and mobile DTT.  
 Regarding the spectrum, the reform of the National Technical Plan for DTT 
carried out by the socialist government in 2005 set out that, after the switch-off, each 
licence-holder for private terrestrial television with national coverage would have a full 
multiplex (in principle, with four programmes). However, that provision has been 
modified by Royal Decree 365/2010 of 26 March, which sets out two phases for the 
allocation of digital multiplexes after the switch-off. In the first phase (June 2010 to 
March 2011), each private licence-holder for DTT with State-wide coverage will be 
allocated frequencies equivalent to one multiplex, but their programmes (four) will 
provisionally be distributed across different multiplexes. In the second phase, the aim is 
to free up the 790-862 MHz sub-band before 1 January 2015 so that it can be set aside for 
mobile broadband services.  
Thus, following the recommendations made by the European Commission, the 
Government of Spain is determined to free up that sub-band, and, in justifying this 
decision, asserts that the digital dividend will contribute to greater social cohesion, to the 
creation of jobs and to the growth of the economy. It estimates that the benefits stemming 
from the use of these frequencies for mobile broadband services in Spain will be between 
€12 billion and €16 billion (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio 2010b). This is 
a decision that will undoubtedly benefit telecommunications companies in a context 
where they have made formal complaints to the European Union about the tax levied on 
them to make up for the removal of advertising from Televisión Española. 
Regarding HDTV and mobile television, the only regulatory provisions that 
existed when analogue terrestrial television was switched off were those included in the 
General Broadcasting Act 7/2010 of 31 March, which systematizes and updates complex 
Spanish legislation on radio and television broadcasting.  
With regard to HD DTT broadcasts, this Act only states that they can be made 
compatible with standard resolution broadcasts, taking account of the established 
capacity limit (Article 35). With regard to mobile television, the same Act states that to 
provide the service, it will be necessary to have a licence and that, to obtain a licence, 
priority will be given to broadcasting service providers with considerable experience. 
Likewise, it sets out that when it comes to planning the available spectrum, a part of it 
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will need to be set aside for public broadcasting services. It also sets out that channels 
with content adapted to the specific features of mobile television will be promoted 
(Article 34). In any event, the Government of Spain has yet to develop the regulations for 
either HDTV or mobile DTT. 
As this article was being concluded, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved 
Royal Decree 691/2010, of 20 May, regulating the introduction of HD DTT in a 
significant amount of detail. 
The Decree stipulates that operators with a full DTT multiplex can broadcast HD 
channels so long as they give advance notice to the competent authority that granted them 
the licence. When two or more operators share a multiplex, agreement between all the 
parties is a prerequisite. 
In order to satisfy complaints made by the Communication Users Association, 
referred to at the beginning of this article, the Decree also stipulates that televisions with 
screens larger than 21 inches sold from 3 December 2010 should incorporate an HD 
receiver.  
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